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The  financial  crisis,  which  began  to  hit 
the trade finance markets in 2008, caused 
a sharp slow-down in trade in 2008 and 
2009.  The  tightening  of  global  credit 
reduced capital inflows and curtailed the 
availability of trade finance. This sudden 
shortage  of  trade  finance  negatively 
impacted  African  economies.  In 
response, the African Development Bank 
(AfDB)  established,  on  March  2009,  a 
multiphase  USD  1  billion  Trade  Finance 
Initiative (TFI). 
 
As  part  of  the  Trade  Finance  Initiative, 
AfDB  commissioned  a  trade  finance 
survey  conducted  three  times  between 
2009 and 2010.  The financial institutions 
contacted  during  these  market  surveys 
are  listed  at  the  end  of  this  document. 
During  this  research,  banks  in  Senegal, 
Burkina  Faso,  Ghana,  Nigeria,  Egypt, 
Morocco, Kenya, South  Africa, Tanzania 
and Rwanda were contacted.  In addition, 
financial  institutions  active  in  the 
international  and  regional  trade  finance 
markets  based  in  the  USA,  UK,  France, 
Germany  and  the  Netherlands  were 
contacted.  Finally, development finance 
institutions  active  in  supporting  trade 
both  within  Africa  and  without  were 
interviewed.   Generally trade operations 
officers,  international  department 
management, treasury officers or senior 
commercial  bankers  were  contacted.  
Participants were asked to: 
 
•  Describe  their  trade  finance  related 
activities 
•  Describe  the  state  of  the  market  for 
trade finance products 
•  Describe  how  availability  of  facilities 
has changed 
•Describe  how  terms  and  conditions  of 
facilities have changed 
•Discuss  overall  economic  activity  in 
their markets 
• Discuss potential roles for AfDB to play 
to facilitate access to trade finance  
 
 
The overall conclusions of these surveys 
are: 
•  African  trade  grew  rapidly  during  the 
pre-crisis  period,  spurred  by  growing 
south-south trade and the emergence of 
Asia as a major purchaser of African raw 
materials  and  primary  products.  
Anecdotally, it appears that trade finance 
was  increasingly  available  during  this 
period. 
• The crisis has had a negative impact on 
African  trade  due  to  falling  demand  for 
African primary product  exports.   Trade 
finance  availability  was  sharply 
constrained  during  the  initial  crisis 
period. 
•  It  is  difficult  to  discern  real  trends  in 
African trade finance as markets remain 
highly  volatile.    Liquidity  and  risk 
appetite vary widely across markets and 
counterparties.  Across all markets, trade 
finance tenors have shortened. 
• There is an overall decrease in demand 
for  trade  products  due  to  decreased 
economic activity but a higher proportion 
of  the  current  transactions  are  using 
trade instruments.   
•  International  commercial  banks  that 
historically  provided  confirmation  lines 
for trade instruments remain risk averse 
and seek to maintain/increase returns. 
• Low income countries and the smaller 
Regional  Member  Countries  are  hit 
hardest by the lack of availability of trade 
finance  due  to  higher  perceived  risk, 
even for low risk transactions. 
• Basel II related capital allocation rules 
will have a negative impact on the cost 
and  availability  of  trade  finance  across 
the continent. 
• Multilateral Development Banks in other 
regions play a variety of roles to support 
trade  finance  availability,  from  which 
AfDB could learn some lessons. 
•  The  African  Development  Bank  can 
have  a  significant  impact  on  trade 
finance  availability  and,  consequently, 
RMC  economic  performance  over  the 




     5 
I.  Introduction 
A  recent  survey  on  the  availability  of  trade  finance  conducted  by  the  International 
Chamber of Commerce concluded “it remains difficult to say with any precision whether 
a  significant  gap  in  the  provision  of  trade  credit  compared  with  corporate  demand 
remains and, if so, how it can be filled by multi-lateral development banks.”  However, 
surveys conducted of financial institutions active in African trade finance in early 2009 
and  updated  in  the  first  quarter  2010  and  again  in  the  third  quarter  2010  show  that 
commercial banks believe that access to trade finance remains constrained, hampering 
economic growth and that the African Development Bank can play an important role 
stabilizing and catalyzing private financial markets. 
The following reviews African trade, and trade finance markets, examines the programs 
other MDBs are implementing and recommends four strategic interventions the African 
Development Bank should further dimension to support trade finance availability and 
economic growth in Africa. 
 
II.  Trends in African Trade 
Summary:  African trade has grown rapidly over the past decade, driven by growth in 
south-south trade and the growing importance of Africa as a supplier of raw materials to 
emerging  Asia.    In  2008,  73%  of  Asia’s  raw  materials  were  imported  from  Africa.   
China is Africa’s second largest trading partner and is among the top ten trading partners 
of  26  African  countries.    African  exports  performed  less  poorly  than  global  exports 
during the financial crisis while imports declined faster than global imports. 
 
The period 1999 to 2008 saw rapid growth of African trade with the world.  According to 
the WTO, African trade grew from 2.2% of the continent’s GDP in 1995 to 3.3% in 2008. 
 
 
Spurred  by  global  growth,  and  consequently  demand  for  Africa’s  primary  products, 
strong regional economic growth, increasing integration into global economies as well as 
high commodity prices, African trade grew faster over the course of the 2000s than any 
other region except China.     6 
 
 
Similarly,  as  world  trade  shrunk  by  12%  from  2008  to  2009,  Africa’s  export  performance 
remained relatively robust, shrinking 8%.  African imports performed less well, shrinking by 18% 
from 2008 to 2009. 
 
Further, there has been a fundamental change in the composition of African trade flows.  Africa’s 
total merchandise trade with non-African developing countries increased from $34 billion in 1995 
to $283 billion in 2008 while trade with developed countries increased from $138 billion to $588 
billion over the same period.  The share of non-African developing countries in Africa’s trade 






The  growth  of  trade  with  non-African  developing  countries  has  been  due  mainly  to 
expanding trade with Asia.  According to UNCTAD, in the 1990s, India, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan were the main drivers of trade growth.  Since 2000 however, the 
expansion of trade between Africa and China has increased nearly tenfold reaching $93 
billion in 2008, making China Africa’s second largest trading partner after the United 
States.  According to UNCTAD, China represents 11% of Africa’s external trade and is 
among the top 10 trading partners of 26 African countries.   
 
The rapid growth in trade with developing countries in the period preceding the financial 
crisis was comprised principally of growth in primary product exports from Africa and 
imports  of  machinery  and  consumer  goods  into  Africa.      As  Asian  economies 
experienced continued rapid growth, the share of primary products imported from Africa 
rose to 73% in 2008 from 55% in 1995.  As would be expected, fuels have dominated 
this growth as a result of increasing oil production in the region and rapidly rising prices 
of oil over the period 2000 to 2008. 







Africa China Brazil World Euro Area USA
Imports Exports












Africa China Brazil World Euro Area USA
Imports Exports




OECD Non Africa  Intra Africa




OECD Non Africa  Intra Africa  7 
 
III.  Financial Crisis Impact on Trade Finance in Africa 
 
Summary:  Prior to the crisis, trade finance availability was increasing in most markets. 
The crisis led to lower demand, increased risk perceptions and volatile markets.  Tenors 
have shortened to less than 180 days versus maximum tenors of 270 to 360 days in 2007. 
Prices, which had reportedly risen 50% from late 2008 to mid 2009 have fallen to 25% 
above pre-crisis levels.  There is an overall decrease in demand for trade products due to 
decreased  economic  activity  but  a  higher  proportion  of  transactions  are  using  trade 
instruments.    International  commercial  banks  that  historically  have  provided 
confirmation lines for those trade instruments remain risk averse. 
Statistics  on  African  trade  are  frequently  idiosyncratic,  incomplete  and  contradictory.  
They are, however, better than statistics related to African trade finance.  There are no 
comprehensive statistics available on African trade finance growth.  There are statistics 
available  from  SWIFT  but  they  may  be  misleading  and  are  very  difficult  to  access.  
However, a review of international trade focused publications and the published financial 
statements of several African banks indicate that trade finance was increasingly available 
and increasingly affordable for African banks during the pre-crisis growth period of 2000 
to 2008. 
For example, Ecobank reported $92 million in contingent liabilities related to clean line 
letters of credit at the end of 2003 and $302 million at the end of 2007.  While these 
numbers are not precisely comparable due to expansion of Ecobank’s branch network 
they are consistent with figures reported by other financial institutions.  Bank of Africa 
reports trade finance commitments of €45 million in 2002 and €128 million at the end of 
2007.  Standard Bank of South Africa report R25.5 billion of outstanding letters of credit 
and trade-related guarantees at the end of 2002 and R52billion in 2008.  On a more 
anecdotal note, during the course of the trade finance survey undertaken in early 2009, 
senior  product  managers  at  Citibank,  BNP,  Standard  Chartered  Bank  and  HSBC  all 
indicated that their exposure to African trade finance had grown rapidly from 2004 to 
2007. 
Similarly,  the  trade  finance  specialty  press  frequently  featured  stories  highlighting 
noteworthy  transactions  indicating  increased  risk  appetite,  increased  transaction  size, 
lower pricing and new borrowers coming to market.   Beginning in earnest in 2005, 
transactions such as crude oil prepayment financing facilities raised for Angola's state-
owned  oil  company  or  COCOBOD’s  pre-export  finance  facilities,  transactions  were 
being hailed as record  breakers in  terms  of size, tenors  or pricing.    In addition  new 
borrowers  were  entering  the  market  as  international  syndicated  financial  transactions 
searched for yield.  One international banker contacted indicated that “in early 2007 we 
could see that there was going to be turmoil in the OECD markets but prices were not 
adjusting.  We were looking for higher returns given the risks we perceived.  We liked 
Nigeria, Angola, energy plays that the market understands.” 
The global financial crisis resulted in a sharp drop in global trade.  Observers indicate 
that total global trade fell by 12% over the course of 2008.  Trade fell in both value and 
volume terms as lower commodity prices, due to falling demand, further impacted trade 
receipts.     8 
Limited financial market integration with the advanced economies did not shield Africa 
from the global economic shocks, rather simply delayed their transmission.  Recessions 
in OECD markets reduced demand for African exports and curtailed worker remittances 
and aid programs.   According to the IMF, GDP growth in countries that were large 
purchasers of African exports fell from 12% per annum in 2004 to -6% in 2009; at the 
same time, prices for oil/gas, African metals and African agrocommodities fell 63%, 31% 
and 18% from their pre-crisis peaks. 
Recent research conducted by the Centre for Economic Policy Research suggests  that 
trade performance in African countries is hit harder by financial crises than other regions.  
Even though the direct effects of the crisis may be weaker due to the relative insulation 
and underdevelopment of the financial systems of most sub-Saharan African countries, 
the indirect effect through trade may be stronger.  It was found that in past financial 
crises, African exports were “more negatively impacted by recessions and financial crises 
than the countries they export to.”  This is not only due to the composition of African 
exports  and  the  concentration  on  primary  goods  as  both  primary  and  manufactured 
exports are hit harder than in other regions.  Another finding is that African exports are 
hit hardest when the importer country is an industrialized country.  
The Centre for Economic Policy Research postulates that higher dependence of African 
exports on trade finance may explain this vulnerability:  during financial crises, when 
uncertainty is high and liquidity is low, banks in importer countries first reduce exposure 
to particular countries that are seen as more risky.  Exporters in countries with strong 
financial systems may be able to better resist such retrenchment, which is not feasible for 
African financial institutions and firms dependent on foreign finance. 
Although this data is preliminary and, according to the authors, “the interpretation of 
results  is  only  tentative”  the  disruption  effect  on  trade  finance  availability  and  the 
consequent  negative  impact  on  trade  and  economic  welfare  as  described  above  is 
consistent with what international commercial banks and African domestic banks report:  
demand has fallen, risk perceptions have increased and overall trade finance is more 
difficult to access.     
The impact of the global financial crisis and its continuing aftermath on trade finance 
availability  in  Africa  was  severe.    In  the  trade  finance  survey  conducted  of  over  70 
financial institutions in the first part of 2009, banks reported both sharp decreases in 
credit  availability  and  increased  pricing.    Banks  reported  that  trade  finance  was 
dominated by a few large international commercial banks including Citibank, Standard 
Chartered Bank, HSBC and Deutsche Bank and some legacy niche players that were 
important  in  specific  markets  or  products.    Smaller  commercial  banks  in  the  region 
indicated  they  were  increasingly  using  facilities  from  emerging  regional  banks  like 
Standard  Bank  of  South  Africa  and  Ecobank  as  well  as  the  offshore  subsidiaries  of 
African banks like Ghana International Bank, Medi Capital and FBN London, although 
these banks indicated that their sources of funding were being constrained by “reduced 
risk appetite” of their European and north American correspondent banks and “lower 
demand for paper in the secondary market.” 
In early 2009, banks in all markets in Africa reported decreased availability of trade 
finance,  shortening  tenors  and  higher  prices.  Banks  contacted  in  Senegal  and  Ghana   9 
reported prices for letter of credit confirmation had increased by 50% from pre-crisis 
levels  while  banks  in  Kenya  consistently  reported  prices  doubling.    Nigerian  banks 
indicated that price increases had been “significant” while financial institutions in Egypt 
and South Africa reported that prices for confirmation lines had increased by over 25% 
and  that  liquidity  was  becoming  difficult  to  access.    Similarly,  banks  in  all  markets 
reported that available tenors were shortening with most indicating that lines were no 
longer available for more than 180 days versus maximum tenors of 270 to 360 days in 
2007.  
The impact of these shocks was moderated by falling demand for trade instruments.  In 
early 2010, banks reported that their customers were using less trade finance instruments. 
In a survey conducted by the Bankers Association for Financing Trade, 41% of African 
financial institutions surveyed indicated a decline in trade finance activities, compared to 
the previous year.  In addition, all financial institutions surveyed reported a drop in trade 
volumes during the first quarter of 2010 attributable to a drop in demand from corporate 
customers.  Similarly, one regional financial institution reported that exports had dropped 
by 40% over 2009 due to depressed demand in developed countries.  Commercial banks 
did report, however, that in late 2010 exports have rebounded due to increasing demand 
from emerging Asia.   
In the first quarter of 2010, commercial banks reported increased liquidity, falling prices 
and depressed demand for trade finance.  “Supply is not the problem” reported one large 
domestic commercial bank.  “Financial Institution capacity [to supply credit] is not the 
issue” reported a regional  commercial bank who reported also  that demand for trade 
transactions remained constrained by low growth in the real economy.  “Imports are way 
down” indicated a medium sized west African financial institution:  “compared to 24 
months ago, demand is not at the same level.”   
According  to  international  commercial  banks  active  in  Africa,  this  situation  prevails 
today.  In the third quarter of 2010, international commercial banks report that demand 
for confirmation lines are “40% of pre-crisis levels.”   
Increased  supply  and  depressed  demand  created  “a  buyer’s  market  for  trade  risk” 
according to an international commercial bank active across the continent.  “Prices are 
falling” was  a common refrain  from  international  commercial banks  contacted in  the 
spring  of  2010.    Most  reported  that  prices,  which  had  reportedly  risen  50%  from 
September  2008  to  June  2009  had  fallen  to  levels  25%  above  pre  crisis  levels  with 
spreads in some markets “down to levels seen in late 2007.”     
The impact of falling prices and increased liquidity did not, however, result in increased 
access  to  trade  instruments,  especially  for  smaller  economic  operators.    Commercial 
banks reported that their customers’ business partners were requiring use of letters of 
credit more frequently than in the immediate pre-crisis period:  “the demand for import 
LCs is up.  Before, we did one LC a week, maybe two.  Now, everyone wants LCs to 
cover the importer risk” commented one large west African financial institution that has a 
significant SME portfolio.  “We have started seeing a lot of small ticket trade items for 
all Africa” reported another international commercial bank.  
The availability of supply has also not impacted tenor availability.  In Nigeria, bankers 
indicate that in the third quarter 2010 short tenors are available and fairly priced but that   10 
“tenors over 90 days are problematic.”  Similarly, bankers in Kenya indicated that “short 
term” transactions are “largely available” but anything longer is difficult to access.  One 
international  bank  reported  that  they  “continue  to  manage  down  the  term  of  our 
exposure” in  order to  “optimize our returns to  a point where we  can  understand the 
future” indicating that they would like to have “an average tenor 10-20% shorter at the 
end of 2010 than we had at the beginning.”   
Accordingly, there is an overall decrease in demand for trade products due to decreased 
economic activity but a higher proportion of transactions are using trade instruments.  
However, international commercial banks that historically have provided confirmation 
lines for those trade instruments remain risk averse and seek to maintain, or increase, 
return levels. 
Liquidity Remains Volatile 
In the first quarter of 2009, all financial institutions reported a sharp decline in liquidity.  
International commercial banks reported that home market management and regulators 
required that they reduce exposure to “high risk” assets.  In addition, as self liquidating 
trade  transactions  ran  off,  international  commercial  banks  were  not  systematically 
renewing lines.  The impact of liquidity concerns in OECD markets cascaded through the 
trade  financial  system  in  Africa  with  regional  commercial  banks  and  domestic 
commercial banks all reporting severe liquidity constraints. Specifically, funded import 
transactions  were  constrained  by  a  contraction  of  the  secondary  market  for  trade 
instruments. 
However, programs like the GTLP and other emergency liquidity facilities have reversed 
this trend to some extent.  In early 2010, one international commercial bank reported that 
“US  and  European  commercial  banks  have  not  fully  restored  their  lines”  but  that 
“liquidity constraints have alleviated.”  Although no statistics were available, regional 
commercial banks  and international financial institutions reported that the “secondary 
market is strong” in early 2010.  In particular, bankers report that larger markets are 
performing well. One off-shore subsidiary of an African bank indicated that in “Nigeria 
and Angola are really picking up.  Demand is high and pricing is getting thin again and 
even  the  secondary  market  for  this  paper  is  picking  up.”    International  commercial 
bankers indicated that for larger markets, liquidity and risk appetite were “showing signs 
of life.”  One international bank active as a secondary market purchaser of African trade 
assets said “the market is normal now.” 
Available  liquidity  may  appear  to  be  overstated  however  as  “there  is  no  demand  by 
economic actors” for trade instruments as final demand remains constrained in both local 
and export markets. Banks reported that demand from Asia was rebounding but there was 
little demand from traditional trading partners.  In addition, in the third quarter of 2010, 
commercial bankers are expressing concerns about the availability of US dollar liquidity, 
particularly in Europe.  Although concerns seems to have abated somewhat since the 
spring of 2010, according to commercial bankers demand for US dollars as a refuge 
currency in Europe is increasing, resulting in less US dollars available for trade finance.  
In  addition,  according  to  commercial  banks  contacted  in  September  2010,  there  are 
several “historical pockets of trade finance” in Europe that are withdrawing from the 
market.  As one bank in the UK expressed “European banks are not well positioned to   11 
generate dollars from African trade flows” and “they are all looking to generate dollars 
today.”   
According to trade finance bankers, the situation with European banks  is  clouded by 
questions  surrounding  the  adequacy  of  their  capital  positions.    According  to  press 
analyses in the third quarter of 2010, the financial markets believe that European bank 
stress tests that were completed in June 2010 did not provide as comprehensive a picture 
of their government-debt holdings as regulators claimed and that “concerns about the 
health of European banks is likely to become an ongoing market factor.” 
Two international banks cited West LB, in particular, as a “huge trade finance provider”--
via secondary market purchases of trade instruments--whose impending exit will disrupt 
the market further.  West LB is seeking to strengthen its capital position by merging with 
another German landesbank and is exiting the African trade finance business as it seeks 
to limit “the number of complex factors that may make this merger unsuccessful.”  When 
contacted,  West  LB  trade  finance  team  maintained  that  they  are  “solving  each 
opportunity as they arise.” 
 
Basel II will negatively impact trade finance availability 
Although the impact may be more pronounced in Africa, the factors that have constrained 
availability to trade finance are not unique to the continent.  In the 2009 survey on trade 
finance  completed  by  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce,  financial  institutions 
across  the  globe  reported  trade  finance  availability  was  being  constrained  by  more 
stringent  credit criteria, strategic refocus  on key markets/sectors/clients  and increased 
capital allocation requirements. 
All banks involved in international trade have commented on the potentially negative 
consequences  from  the proposed application of the Basel  II standards.  In particular, 
international commercial banks and large regional banks that are more integrated into 
international  financial  markets  are  concerned  that  increased  capital  allocation 
requirements will result in sharply higher cost of trade finance and may also negatively 
impact supply. 
The term Basel II is usually used for the framework of rules and standards for assessing 
the capital adequacy of banks and their exposures to risks  through lending and other 
operations. The rules and standards have been formulated by the Basel Committee on 
Banking  Supervision  (BCBS).    Based  at  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  the 
BCBS initially set out these standards for the banks of the G-10 countries. The initial 
standards set in 1988 is known as Basel I, but its inadequacies became  clear quickly and 
the  revision,  involving  very  wide  global  consultations,    resulted  in  Basel  II.  Of  111 
countries surveyed by BIS in 2006, 95 indicated that they planned to introduce Basel II.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis, Basel III has emerged.  One banker at a global 
commercial bank reported that they are “just understanding Basel II and we are not even 
sure what Basel III will do.” 
Among the specific factors cited as contributing to the tightening of the availability and 
terms  of  trade  finance,  in  addition  to  the  contraction  of    international  trade,  are  the 
increases in the capital adequacy requirements due to the introduction of Basel II.  In   12 
addition to the commercial bankers contacted as part of the series of TF surveys, Basel II-
related capital adequacy requirements were cited in two 2009 global surveys of trade 
finance, one by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Banking Commission and 
another by the Bankers' Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT). These indicate the 
scale  and  geographical  distribution  of  the  contractions  for  major  categories  of  trade 
finance and point to a widespread increase in its price. 
According to the BAFT survey, there was a 4% increase in the global value of trade 
finance between the fourth quarters of 2007 and 2008 followed by a sharp fall of 11% 
between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009. In emerging markets 
as well as OECD markets there were contractions in the value of trade finance with 
BAFT  reporting  a  fall  in  both  LC  and  other  trade  instrument  use  across  all  markets 
surveyed. 
The  ICC  Banking  Commission  survey,  conducted  in  the  winter  of  2009  when  the 
pressures on financial markets during the aftermath of the demise of Lehman Brothers 
were particularly acute, found that substantial proportions of responding institutions had 
recently decreased credit related to trade finance but also that there had been increases in 
the proportion of trade-finance transactions involving lower risk such as those supported 
by  letters  of  credit  and  insurance  or  guarantees  and  a  reduction  in  the  proportion 
involving the simpler,  cheaper but  also  potentially riskier open-account  transactions.   
Accordingly, the supply of capital available for risk mitigation was decreasing while the 
demand for risk mitigation products was rising. 
Among banks covered by the BAFT survey, 43% reported that Basel II had a negative 
impact on their capacity to provide trade finance. 
Commercial bankers surveyed by BAFT, the ICC and over the past 18 months all point to 
two major structural problems associated with the Basel II guidelines.  First, and most 
importantly, bankers note Basel II’s focus on counterparty risk rather than product or 
performance risk. This leads to the estimation of capital requirements as an increasing 
function of the probability of default and, loss given default (both of which increase 
during downturns like the current one) and to the attribution of insufficient importance to 
the  mitigating  factors  of  the  low  risk,  self-liquidating  character  of  trade-finance 
instruments. 
Consistently, commercial bankers contacted across market segments and bank types all 
report that trade finance in Africa is a low risk proposition.  Importing basic consumer 
goods,  housing  materials  and  food  via  short  tenor  transactions  with  well  known 
counterparties are risks the banks feel they understand and can manage.  As one African 
banker put it “when you have local knowledge, you know how safe these transactions 
really  are.”    Similarly,  exporting  raw  materials,  minerals,  fuels  and  other  primary 
products typically between long associated counterparties over short tenors is “as vanilla 
as vanilla gets” according to one international commercial bank.  However, the Basel II 
counterparty approach to risk rating requires that, in the absence of data sufficient to 
model expected performance, trade assets, as cross border assets, require capital allocated 
at the level of the sovereign ceiling of the host country.  Commercial bankers contacted 
feel that this “grossly overstates” transaction risks and “encourages our head office to 
seek increased prices or decreased lines.”   13 
In late 2010, commercial banks active in the European market for African trade assets 
expect this situation to worsen given the market expectation that European banks are not 
sufficiently  capitalized against their own sovereign risks.   One European commercial 
bank  trade  financier  indicated  that  his  team  “is  already  under  pressure  to  increase 
collateral or returns” from that bank’s internal risk management team.  The same banker 
also indicated that this pressure is not Africa-specific but that “in  all non-investment 
grade markets, the pressure is to use our capital better.” 
In addition, Basel II sets a one year floor on the effective maturity of exposure when it 
estimates capital requirements for transactions.  Although most trade finance institutions 
report their average tenor as less than 180 days, the 12 month floor established under 
Basel II requires capital set asides as if all transactions were a minimum of 12 months, 
effectively doubling the capital required for a typical 180 day letter of credit. 
“We get hit twice” reported one international commercial banker contacted in the spring 
of 2010 “the first time is with the counterparty approach and the second is with the 12 
month floor.”  Bankers contacted report that these two elements will have a significant 
impact on their costs of funds and this “will certainly be passed on” to their customers. 
 
IV.  Multilateral Development Bank Support to Trade Finance 
Summary:  There are different approaches employed to support trade finance.  The 
Inter-American Development Bank has been successful by marketing trade products as 
one  of  a  portfolio  of  financial  institution  targeted  products.    The  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  has  focused  on  developing  links  between  Asia  and  Latin 
Amercia/Caribbean.  The Asian Development Bank has leveraged its Risk Participation 
Agreement  product  to  allow  rapid  growth.    The  Asian  Development  Bank  is  highly 
responsive and customer focused.  IFC has a wide range of products to support trade and 
large processing capacity.  IFC is seen as strong partner.  IFC’s cannot finance public 
sector transactions which limits its impact in Africa. 
As part of the global public-/private-sector partnership effort to address the crisis, the 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) launched new programs or enhanced current 
programs to provide credit and liquidity for the import/export marketplace. In April 2009, 
the G-20 pledged to ensure the availability of at least $250 billion over the next two years 
to support trade finance through export credit and investment agencies and through the 
MDBs.  
According to industry observers, each of the MDB programs provide valuable support to 
the international trade community and the MDBs play an important, but limited, role in 
providing support to the trade finance markets.  Bankers felt that “private sector funding 
for trade always lags” and was described by one banker as “pro-cyclical…when it is 
needed, it is not there and when there is no need, there is too much.” 
There are different models employed by the MDB programs to extend the availability of 
trade finance.  Each of these programs describe themselves as “market based” and report 
that they “do not compete with the market on price.”   Users of these programs that were 
contacted describe them all as “expensive.” 
Several of these programs will be examined below:   14 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
The EBRD Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) aims to promote foreign trade to, from and 
within  central  and  eastern  Europe  and  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States.  
Through the program, the EBRD provides guarantees to confirming banks in order to 
“take  the  political  and  commercial  payment  risk  of  transactions  undertaken  by 
participating  issuing  banks  in  the  countries  where  the  EBRD  operates.”    Since  its 
inception in 1999, the TFP has closed almost 9000 trade transactions for a total value of 
almost €5 billion. 
The TFP is open to issuing banks registered in all the EBRD’s countries of operations 
including banks with majority foreign ownership and subsidiaries of foreign banks.  The 
EBRD bases its acceptance of bank risk on the financial standing of the issuing bank, the 
quality of its governance structures and their level of activity in trade financing.  All 
international banks are eligible to join the TFP as confirming banks and selected banks 
from the region that have significant experience in trade finance instruments may also act 
as confirming banks. 
As of September 2010, the EBRD works with 116 issuing banks in 20 member countries.  
EBRD  has  relationships  with  at  least  500  confirming  banks.    Several  international 
commercial  banks  contacted  indicate  that  TFP  is  easy  to  work  with  and  has  well 
developed policies and procedures but that “these could be streamlined”.  No TFP issuing 
banks were contacted.    
According to the ICC, over the course of 2009 and early 2010 foreign exporters and 
foreign commercial banks  were declining new  business,  even with  100% EBRD risk 
cover under TFP guarantee facilities because they did not have sufficient liquidity to 
finance these transactions particularly in cases of larger amounts and longer tenors.  
As a result, the EBRD offers, not only up to 100% risk cover for letters of credit issued 
by TFP client banks in Eastern Europe and the CIS, but also provides issuing banks with 
the necessary liquidity for pre-export finance, post-import finance and financing for the 
local distribution of imported goods.  
In 2009, in order to compensate for the lack of available trade limits from the commercial 
market, more than 850 foreign trade transactions for the total amount of €550 million 
were supported by the EBRD’s TFP program.  To accommodate growing demand, EBRD 
increased the ceiling on the TFP from €800 million to €1.5 billion in January 2009. 
Asian Development Bank Trade Finance Program 
The Asian Development Bank Trade Finance Program provides guarantees and loans to 
180 partner banks in order to increase financial support to companies engaged in import 
and export activities in Asia’s most challenging markets. 
The ABD TFP is available for public sector transactions. 
The ADB TFP supported $2 billion in transactions in 2009.  According to the ABD the 
average tenor of their guarantees is less than 180 days.  ADB’s program comprises three 
products: 
Credit  Guarantee:    ADB  provides  guarantees  of  up  to  100%  risk  protection  against 
nonpayment by approved participating banks, in support of trade transactions.   15 
Risk  Participation  Agreement:    For  banks  with  large  and  consistent  trade  finance 
volumes,  ADB  provides  a  maximum  50%  risk  protection  against  nonpayment  of  a 
financial obligation issued by a bank in support of a trade transaction. Unlike the CG 
product, the Risk Participation Agreement (RPA) provides risk protection on a portfolio 
basis, rather than on a transaction-by-transaction basis.  
Revolving  Credit  Facility:    ADB  provides  revolving  loans  to  eligible  banks  for  on-
lending to importers and exporters to finance trade-related transactions.  This product is 
most frequently used for pre-export financing. 
The ADB TFP has  existed since 2004.  According to product managers at ADB the 
program was resource constrained for the first three years.  ADB reports that the creation 
of  the  RPA  which  allowed  them  to  “ramp  up  the  program  with  no  need  for  huge 
resources” is key to their recent rapid growth.   
The RPA program  guarantees  up to  50% of partner banks’ confirmation exposure to 
issuing banks on a portfolio basis. 
The  ADB  TFP  team  works  with  6  “very  carefully  chosen”  international  commercial 
banks to determine portfolio asset acceptance criteria, individual issuing bank limits and 
eligible transactions and then delegates management responsibility to those banks.  The 
RPA partner banks report monthly on their exposure and ADB TFP management reviews 
portfolio performance and perspectives with RPA partner banks on a monthly basis. 
According to ADB TFP management, the experience with the RPA program has allowed 
them “to learn about the potential issuing banks in a cost effective way.”  Since the roll-
out of the RPA program, the ADB TFP CG program “has accelerated rapidly.” 
The ADB TFP team is comprised of 10 FTEs although team management thinks “this 
could  be  reduced”  since  they  “greatly  expanded  as  the  business  grew.”    The  team 
comprises three relationship managers each with one middle office support and a total of 
2 operations FTEs.  Industry observers and partner banks describe ADB TFP as “very 
efficient” with response times within 48 hours.  An RPA partner bank described ADB 
TFP as “very flexible” and continued that “it took a large upfront investment in time” but 
that once they began working together “they are very easy to work with and very quick to 
respond.” 
The ADB TFP team does not specifically target small and medium enterprise borrowers 
but report, “about 50% of our transactions are with SMEs.”  ADB TFP believes that “this 
business captures the SME flows naturally” as SME-related transactions are typically 
“those that need our support.” 
The ADB TFP is currently working with the International Chamber of Commerce to 
develop a pilot trade credit default register to analyze trade finance performance data in 
order “to demonstrate empirically that trade finance carries low risk compared with other 
forms of finance.” 
The ADB TFP is currently working with the Inter-American Development Bank’s Trade 
Finance  Facilitation  Program  to  explore  opportunities  to  share  access  to  their  trade 
finance programs, linking more than 100 financial institutions to support trade between 
companies in Asia and Latin America.   16 
Inter-American Development Bank Trade Finance Facilitation Program 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) considers trade activities to be crucial to 
the growth of Latin American economies.  IDB considers that the regional Trade Finance 
Facilitation  Program  (TFFP)  complements  their  broader  strategy  to  support  financial 
sector growth.   
Operating since 2005, the TFFP extends Credit Guarantees in the form of Standby Letters 
of Credit in favor of confirming banks to cover the risk they take on eligible trade finance 
instruments  issued  by  Latin  American  issuing  banks.    Covering  up  100%  on  a 
transaction-by-transaction basis, TFFP management describes their program as “the most 
successful of [the IDB’s] financial institution” programs.   
The TFFP works with 66 issuing banks but expects this to increase to 100 issuing banks 
by  2012.    TFFP  provides  both  guarantees  and  direct  loans  to  issuing  banks.    TFFP 
management  believes  that  “guarantees  alone  do  not  work”  as  “liquidity  is  always  a 
problem”  whenever  there  is  any  kind  of  crisis.    TFFP  management  reports  that  the 
average transaction tenor is 200 days but they will extend facilities up to 3 years.  TFFP 
management reports that they have a global exposure limit of $1 billion with outstanding 
facilities averaging $200 million.   
The TFFP is positioned as one of a basket of products that IDB FI relationship managers 
market to commercial banks in the region.  Exposure limits are determined by the FI 
team, who also monitor line usage and performance.  The TFFP team is comprised of two 
product managers and one operations FTE.  TFFP management feels that IDB’s multi-
product FI strategy is the key element in their successful and sustainable growth. 
TFFP also conducts trade capacity building programs for issuing banks and their SME 
customers.  TFFP management does not see a link between product use and training.  
They report “there is no real impact.  Everyone knows it is important and it makes IDB 
management more comfortable” but it does not result in increased facilities.   
TFFP believes trade between Latin America and China presents an important growth 
opportunity.  The IDB has sponsored a series of Latin American forums in Beijing in 
order to build awareness of trade financing in the region.  Issuing banks in Latin America 
do not have lines with Chinese banks and have difficulty getting confirmations.  TFFP 
has recently begun working with the Asian Development Bank’s Trade Finance Program 
to increase information exchange between Asian and Latin American banks. 
International Finance Corporation Global Trade Finance Program 
In November 2008, the IFC doubled its Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP) ceiling to 
$3 billion. The GTFP offers confirming banks partial or full guarantees covering payment 
risk  on  banks  in  the  emerging  markets  for  trade-related  transactions.  The  program 
comprises  148  issuing  banks  in  74  countries  and  operates  in  emerging  markets 
throughout the world. 
The GTFP is generally considered extremely effective by participating banks and has 
grown rapidly.   In 2010, IFC reported that they had worked with 183 issuing banks and 
198 confirming banks since the program’s inception in XXX.  In the first nine months of 
2010,  IFC  issued  2081  guarantees  for  $2.4  billion,  increases  of  270%  and  210% 
respectively from 2007.  IFC reports that 84% of their transactions are for less than $1   17 
million with a median value of $158,000.  GTFP reports that average tenor is 160 days. 
GTFP management reports that program growth is constrained by the inadequate capital 
position of the smaller banks that need their support.  In addition, GTFP management 
indicates that issuing bank AML/KYC policies are frequently insufficient to meet IFC 
requirements and “significant capacity building is required.” 
GTFP can only work with private sector FIs and only on private sector trade transactions. 
International Finance Corporation Global Trade Liquidity Program 
The IFC Global Trade Liquidity Program (GTLP) is the newest program to be instituted 
in response to the global trade finance crisis. In May 2009, the GTLP was launched by 
the IFC to address liquidity issues in trade finance. The program is designed to support up 
to $50 billion in international trade in the next three years. In July 2009, the program 
began  dispersing  GTLP  funds  through  the  first  four  participating  banks  (Standard 
Chartered Bank, Citigroup, Rabobank Nederland, and Standard Bank of South Africa) to 
provide trade finance through a network of more than 500 banks in over 70 developing 
countries  across  all  regions.  Funds  for  the  program  will  be  mobilized  through  the 
participating banks and the program partners, including the AfDB, the UK, Canadian and 
Dutch governments, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the OPEC Fund for 
International Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development. 
IFC believes that the market for trade finance is moving beyond requiring liquidity and is 
requiring more guarantees.  Accordingly, they have launched GTFP Phase 2, or GTLP-G, 
a  portfolio-based,  risk-sharing,  unfunded  program  created  in  response  to  increasing 
demand for unfunded regional solutions by governments and banks. 
GTLP-G, Central and Eastern Europe: The Guarantee part of Phase 2 was launched in 
January  with  SIDA  –  the  Swedish  International  Development  Corporation  Agency  - 
which provided up to $125 million for unfunded guarantees to support trade in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
GTLP-G, Africa; GTLP-G, Latin America: IFC indicates they have received increased 
interest from partners in guarantee programs that would target trade in Africa and Latin 
America and “are working on developing additional targeted regional solutions.” 
In addition, IFC is launching a food and agriculture specific trade liquidty program called 
GTLP Agri.  According to IFC, GTLP Agri complements the G-8 pledge to invest $18 
billion in agriculture investments and food security over the next three years, and trade 
was specifically noted to be central to their Food Security Initiative. It is a short-term 
debt structure aimed at facilitating global trade of food and agribusiness commodities to 
support agricultural trade by leveraging the GTLP platform. The goal is to raise $700 
million from DFIs/governments over the next 12 months to develop a $1 billion GTLP 
Agri  program.  IFC  reports  it  is  seeing  increasing  demand  for  such  sector  specific 
solutions from banks. 
In the 2009 trade market report, the ICC reported that “the majority indicated that their 
institution has been utilizing trade facilitation programmes implemented by MDBs.” 
In the  ICC survey, banks  felt that  “in  the months  to  come, financial markets  should 
continue to improve if sustained efforts by governments and international organizations   18 
are maintained.” 
 
V.  Potential role of AfDB 
The African Development Bank can play an important role in minimizing the negative 
impact of crises in Africa by supporting the availability of trade finance.  There are four 
strategic investments that AfDB could make to complement and crowd-in the private 
sector.    Each  is  modular,  i.e.,  can  be  initiated  with  a  low  initial  investment  and 
expanded/modified  as  market  demand  is  better  understood.    Further,  each  addresses 
public market failures so is appropriate for quasi-public sector investment.  Finally, each 
will  have  the  potential  to  visibly  strengthen  AfDB’s  partnership  with  international 
commercial banks as well as financial institutions in regional member countries. 
As discussed above, trade finance markets in Africa continue to experience significant 
volatility.  During the height of the financial crisis in 2009, banks reported limited risk 
appetite and lack of liquidity, particularly in the secondary markets, as major constraints 
to their ability to finance trade.  Over the course of the past 18 months, markets have 
evolved and, to some degree, stabilized but liquidity and risk appetite remain problematic 
and volatile. 
Commercial banks, industry observers, development finance institutions and specialized 
trade finance institutions all agree there is a role for the AfDB to play supporting trade 
finance availability in Africa.   It is not surprising that commercial banks indicated they 
would like to see AfDB more active in risk mitigation and providing liquidity.  The 
African Development Bank can play an important role in addressing these constraints in a 
modular and low resource manner, both by supporting industry infrastructure to address 
information gaps that constrain trade lending as well as by providing direct credit and 
liquidity support to financial institutions financing trade in Africa.   
By creating a small, dedicated trade finance team, that incorporates the best elements of 
the other MDB trade finance initiatives, the AfDB can scale its trade finance support 
initiatives  as  the  market  develops  and  the  AfDB  further  dimensions  resource 
requirements.  Focusing, initially, on working through commercial financial institutions 
the AfDB can develop the institutional competences necessary to deploy a full-fledged 
trade  finance  program,  if  desired.    In  addition  supporting  industry  infrastructure  and 
promoting  Asian-African  trade  will  indirectly  stimulate  trade  finance  availability.  
Finally, trade finance availability will extend the impact of AfDB’s regional integration 
investments. 
 
Support Industry-wide Infrastructure to Address Information Gaps 
Summary: Basel II will increase cost of trade finance in Africa due to lack of consistent, 
portable and validatable data on trade asset performance over time.  Asian Development 
Bank and International Chamber of Commerce are establishing a Trade Finance Default 
Register.  The African Development Bank should collaborate with AsDB and ICC and 
develop an African Trade Finance Default Register.   19 
Commercial bankers contacted indicated that Basel II’s capital allocation requirements 
related to non-rated transactions significantly increase the cost of trade financing trade 
with small and medium sized enterprises or in non-investment grade countries.  Since the 
large majority of the AfDB’s Regional Member Countries are non-investment grade and 
many  African  traders  are  SMEs,  the  increased  costs  associated  with  access  to  trade 
finance result in significantly higher costs for trade finance.  Similarly, the recent ICC 
survey found that “there remain strong constraints to trade finance” in sub-Saharan Africa 
due to “the high cost of obtaining information on counterparty risk and resulting low 
profitability.”  Bankers report that these costs are likely to increase given the application 
of Basel II rules. 
Although it has long been suggested that trade finance is a low risk asset class, there has 
been little empirical information to support this argument.  In response to this, the Asian 
Development Bank and the International Chamber of Commerce have established a joint 
ICC/Asian Development Bank Trade Finance Default Register.  The creation of the trade 
register recognizes that Basel II rules place an unnecessary strain on banks in capital 
utilization to support issuance of trade finance instruments and fails to  recognize the 
lower  risk  profile  that  trade  instruments  have  compared  to  an  unsecured  credit.  
ICC/ABD have sent out questionnaires to participating banks collecting information on 
letter of credit transactions,  LC volumes and asset performance with the intention of 
providing the Basel committee with empirical evidence to support a request for relaxation 
of rules. 
The  initial  report  from  the  ICC/ADB  trade  register  examines  portfolio  level  data 
comprising  over  5  million  transactions,  provided  by  nine  international  banks  with 
operations in both developed and developing countries.  Data was provided on import 
LCs, export LCs, guarantees/standby LCs, import loans and export loans covering the 
period 2005-2009, The average tenor of trade finance transactions in the registry was 115 
days. 
The registry data reports only 1,140 defaults with import loans (refinancing of import 
LCs) showing the highest default rate of 0.29% and guarantees/SBLCs,  the lowest at 
0.01% defaulting.  More interestingly, the data show only 445 defaults in 2008-2009 out 
of  2.8  million  transactions.    Indeed,  the  rates  of  default  declined  during  the  crisis, 
although not significantly so.   
The African Development Bank should collaborate closely with the ICC/Asian initiative 
in order to dimension and document trade product performance in Africa over time.  This 
will provide the BCBS with the data necessary for them to provide a short term exception 
to the rules associated with capital allocation and trade assets.  The trade register can be 
useful only if it becomes a comprehensive and long term tool that is updated on a regular 
basis and is used by both regulators and banks to assess the riskiness of the trade finance 
market. 
Commercial  bankers  in  all  markets  report  that  their  SME  sectors  are  increasingly 
focusing on modernization and consequently require capital investment.  Commercial 
banks indicated that clients were seeking term trade credit enhancement in order to access 
financing  from  Export  Credit  Agencies.    Across  markets,  domestically  focused 
commercial  banks  of  all  sizes  indicate  that  only  highly  limited  term  facilities  are   20 
available for SMEs.  Domestic commercial banks felt that they are “gaining experience”, 
although they are mixed, with SMEs but “cannot lend large amounts for long periods of 
time” constraining modernization possibilities.  
SME access to finance is indirectly affected by Basel II as most international credit flows 
are to large established firms.  The SME sector is considered higher risk because of a 
generalized  lack  of  credit  history,  performance  track  record  and  lack  of  adequate 
collateral.  The lack of credit history constrains financial institutions from developing 
ratings systems to differentiate risks across firms.  In the absence of a validatable system 
for risk rating, all non-rated transactions require the highest capital allocation, rendering 
SME finance more expensive relative to other sectors of the economy.  The AfDB should 
also seek to develop an SME finance performance registry, which, while not directly 
trade-related will stimulate small exporter access to financing and small importer access 
to capital equipment. 
Commercial banks contacted all indicated they would be interested in providing data to 
the financial performance registries if they could access the overall data and the data was 
used to advocate for more rational capital allocation regulations. 
Support to developing and disseminating trade finance data harnesses AfDB’s unique 
assets:    collaborative  relationships  with  commercial  finance  institutions  across  the 
continent and meets the criteria established for AfDB investments: 
Effective:  The  absence  of  portable,  validatable  and  consistent  data  on  trade  finance 
transactions constrains the ability of a range of actors from participating in the growth of 
the trade finance market.  It is expected that data collected in a trade finance performance 
registry will be useful not only to the BCBS regulators but could also contribute to the 
growth  of  the  factoring  industry,  incite  specialized  trade  finance  funds  to  invest  in 
African trade assets and contribute to a better understanding of the overall trade finance 
market in Africa. 
Efficient:  The investment in data collection from financial institutions with whom the 
AfDB has existing relationships and feeding that data into a model already developed by 
AsDB and ICC are both low resource investments and are unlikely to require additional 
human resources but should have a large impact on trade finance provision. 
Prudent:  AfDB’s support to a trade finance performance registry is a low risk investment 
and should contribute to a more accurate pricing of risk in the African trade finance 
markets. 
Recognizable:  The creation of the African trade finance performance register can be 
branded as an AfDB initiative and will be recognized among participants as an AfDB 
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Direct Support to Trade Financiers through Portfolio Guarantees 
Summary:  LIC-based commercial banks cannot access adequate financing due to high 
perceived risks.  Individual guarantees to confirming banks will require a large team to 
analyze  credits  and  monitor  usage/performance.    Partial  portfolio-based  guarantees 
issued to well-managed commercial banks will stimulate private sector finance to LICs.  
A  partial  portfolio  guarantee  program  will  allow  the  AfDB  to  dimension  resource 
requirements  and  develop  the  institutional  competences  necessary  to  deploy  a  multi-
product trade finance offering. 
It is not sufficient to provide indirect support to trade finance through regulatory changes. 
The  WTO  expert  group  on  May  18,  2010,  indicated  that  African  banks  are  still  not 
getting adequate financing, particularly those in LICs, where access to liquidity is still 
costly or even prohibitive.  This is consistent with reports from banks contacted during 
the surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010.  Throughout, commercial banks indicated that 
smaller markets were unable to access sufficient financing as they were perceived as too 
risky. 
There  are  many  options  available  to  AfDB  to  support  trade  finance,  as  has  been 
demonstrated by other MDB support to trade finance.  Over time, AfDB should consider 
opportunities for direct support to issuing banks and confirming banks through guarantee 
issuance  programs  similar  to  GTFP  or  the  IDB  TFFP.    However,  as  both  those 
institutions have indicated, this is resource intensive in its conception and operation as 
AfDB  would  need  teams  to  analyze  the  credit-worthiness  of  issuing  banks,  monitor 
performance and line usage and process a large number of transactions.  Rather, AfDB 
should  apply  the  lessons  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  and  develop  and  apply  a 
portfolio-based risk participation product. 
The Asian Development Bank RPA product is designed to share risk with international 
commercial  banks  and  relies  on  those  banks  to  perform  credit/risk  analysis  on  those 
financial  institutions  as  well  as  originate,  process  and  monitor  those  transactions.  
AsDB’s role is to issue guarantees in favour of six carefully selected commercial banks, 
whose credit origination and administration processes are robust enough for AsDB. 
Similarly, AfDB can develop and implement an RPA program to support increased trade 
credit in Africa.  Commercial banks in small markets have indicated that international 
and pan-regional commercial banks’ limited risk appetite for their opened LCs constrains 
their ability to provide trade finance.  An RPA program,  guaranteeing  up to 50% of 
portfolio  exposure  will  increase  trade  financing  available.    As  one  international 
commercial banker described, “this will bring in the private sector, help us understand the 
risk environment better and, hopefully, expand our footprint.” 
AfDB  should  consider  working  with  regional  financial  institutions  as  well  as 
international commercial banks in an RPA program.  AfDB should consider the efficacy 
of the credit initiation and administration capacities of pan-African banks like Standard 
Bank  of  South  Africa,  Ecobank  and  Bank  of  Africa.    Over  time,  AfDB  should  also 
consider working with the offshore subsidiaries of African banks like FBN London and 
Ghana International Bank.  This support, which can be structured as the AfDB gains 
experience  in  this  product  should  support  the  continued  growth  of  African-focused 
service  providers  and  insulate  Africa’s  trade  finance  markets,  to  some  degree,  from   22 
external shocks. 
AfDB  direct  support  to  trade  financiers  will  attract  additional  risk  appetite  into  the 
market,  especially  for  low-income  country  or  small  market  financial  institutions, 
according  to  commercial  bankers  contacted  and  is  a  good  starting  point  for  a  trade 
facilitation program.  As product managers at the AsDB indicated, their RPA program 
allowed the bank to “learn about the issuing banks in a cost effective way.”  Further, this 
support  will  not  displace  commercial  bank  lines.    An  international  commercial  bank 
indicated they only use the AsDB facilities when they “are fully booked elsewhere”.  
Similarly, commercial banks contacted report that they only use IFC facilties when they 
have no other available credit lines.  The BAFT survey on commercial banks indicated 
that they “prefer to keep commissions” and will only seek recourse to MDB programs 
when they need additional credit facilities. 
Effective:  As noted above, commercial banks believe that portfolio support for trade 
finance assets, particularly for low income countries, will result in expanded access to 
trade finance for African importers and exporters.  The Asian Development Bank was 
reluctant  to  share  statistics,  but  they  believe  that  their  RPA  program  has  resulted  in 
“greatly expanded trade finance availability.” 
Efficient:  IFC reported in 2009 that “a DFI needs to have several billion dollars in the 
trade finance market before you can begin to have positive returns.”  This is true if the 
DFI is seeking to create a whole trade facilitation program like the GTFP.  AML/KYC, 
credit origination and administration policies and marketing the program are resource 
intensive.    However,  emulating  the  AsBD  portfolio  approach  would  leverage  the 
capacities of commercial banks with whom the AfDB would be sharing credit risk.  This 
program could be established with one FTE to market to, and assess the procedures of the 
selected  partner  banks.    In  addition,  monthly  or  quarterly  guarantee  issuance  and 
monitoring will require only limited processing support.  Over time, AfDB can increase 
its exposure to issuing banks, and consequently, resources devoted to trade finance, as it 
learns the dynamics of this market. 
Prudent:  According to the Asian Development Bank, portfolio-based risk participation 
agreements  leverage  the  credit  processes  of  the  commercial  banking  partners.    As 
interests are aligned due to risk sharing, AfDB can complement market supply in a low 
risk manner and scale up the Bank’s risk acceptance profile over time. 
Recognizable:  International,  regional  and  domestic  commercial  banks  surveyed  all 
identify the AfDB as a preferred partner for financial market development across the 
continent.    By  working  with  larger  financial  institutions,  AfDB  will  leverage  their 
marketing networks and increase the Bank’s visibility in local financial markets. 
Trade Finance to Support Regional Integration 
Summary:  Intra-African  trade  is  inhibited  by  weak  infrastructural  linkages.  Intra-
African trade has more short-term development impact than extra-African trade.  AfDB is 
committed  to  supporting  regional  market  integration.    Trade  finance  products, 
particularly a small and focused guarantee product or targeted trade loans should be 
included in all regional integration investments. 
The success of Africa’s regional integration efforts has been limited.   There are many   23 
factors that could explain this, including lack of cross-border infrastructure, beggar-thy-
neighbor  economic  policies  and  conflicting  trade  policies  and  procedures.    However, 
research has also shown that regional integration efforts are most successful when intra-
regional  trade  represents  a  large  share  of  total  trade  prior  to  the  regional  integration 
initiative.    According  to  research  undertaken  in  the  1990s,  those  regional  integration 
initiatives  in  which  trade  has  grown  rapidly  (i.e.  APEC,  NAFTA),  trade  expansion 
preceded the regional integration and not vice versa.  Accordingly, it can be demonstrated 
that increased intra-regional trade supports regional integration efforts. 
In Africa intra-regional trade is inhibited by weak infrastructural linkages.  Poor port 
facilities,  weak  communication  links  and  underdeveloped  road  networks  all  limit  the 
potential for expanding regional trade.  Earlier this year, the AfDB President said the “the 
solution  to  unlocking  the  internal  market  potentials  and  developing  [Africa’s]  vast 
resources lies on regional integration, which will have a major impact on the cost of 
doing business in the region and cost of access to the world.”  Regional integration is 
necessary  in  Africa  since  a  large  number  of  the  continent’s  economies  are  small, 
landlocked and fragmented which hamper market expansion, thus limiting the potential 
for economies of scale.  In the absence of regional integration, African firms will remain 
home-market based, will not gain efficiency through larger markets and will not be able 
to compete in the global marketplace for anything but raw materials. 
African trade with Africa has significantly more development impact than trade with the 
rest  of  the  world.    Intra-African  trade  remains  relatively  modest,  reaching  only  $30 
billion in intra-African exports, or 14% of African total exports in 2009, or roughly 10% 
more than African exports to China.  However, if the composition of exports is examined, 
as in the figure below, it is apparent that exports within the continent create more jobs 
and have a higher poverty reduction impact than export of primary fuels and metals to 
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Accordingly, expansion of intra-African trade should yield significant benefits to African 
countries.  According to UNCTAD, 80% of African countries export more manufactured 
products to other African countries than they do elsewhere in the world. 
There are number of large scale investments undertaken by the AfDB to support regional 
integration and intra-African trade.  Each of these projects presupposes the availability of 
trade finance.  For example, the UC 37 million financing for the Ndali-Nikki-Chicandou-
Nigeria road project is intended to augment regional trade and stimulate agro-exports 
from Benin to regional markets, particularly by micro and small enterprises.  Similarly, 
the Burundi infrastructure action plan--estimated to cost a total of $5.8 billion--should 
“improve trade through air and rail links.”    In addition, the AfDB has financed over 
$190 million to link Congo and Cameroon to address the large “untapped agricultural 
potential for trade” between the two nations. 
Projects  like  these  are  consistent  with  the  recommendations  of  the  UN  Economic 
Commission for Africa’s ARIA IV which analyzes the status of intra-African trade, its 
progress  and the challenges that must be addressed in  legal,  policy, institutional  and 
infrastructural  capacities  at  the  national,  regional  and  continental  levels.    ARIA  IV 
concludes  that  regional  integration  projects,  “particularly  in  the  development  of 
infrastructure are necessary” to address the challenges of economic growth and poverty 
reduction in Africa.  According to ARIA IV, dilapidated and inadequate infrastructure 
and services affect the cost of production and transactions as do antiquated trade policy 
regimes and inconsistent administrative and registration procedures.  
The  AfDB  should  place  a  specific  focus  on  trade  finance  as  it  relates  to  regional 
infrastructure investments.  As the market has indicated through the numerous surveys, 
low-income  countries  will  not  simply  attract  financing  when  all  the  other  necessary 
conditions are met.  Roads can be built, policy regimes modernized and agro-productivity 
enhanced.  However, without finance the full impact of these investments will not be 
realized.  Support for trade finance is necessary, particularly in the small, landlocked, low 
income  countries  that  do  not  generate  sufficient  transaction  volume  to  attract 
international financial institutions. 
In  addition,  AfDB  should  work  with  regional  member  countries  to  improve  the 
harmonization of trade facilitation and trade administration procedures through aid for 
trade programs.  Gains from physical infrastructure investments will be limited by poorly 
developed and inconsistent institutional arrangements. 
The AfDB support for trade finance provision via regional integration initiatives could be 
in  the form of targeted lines  or risk participation through financiers of infrastructure 
projects.  Marginal AfDB support to trade finance alongside infrastructure investments 
will  encourage  the  private  financial  markets  to  participate  in  financing  trade.    It  is 
catalytic and supports regional economic growth.  AfDB should sign risk participation 
agreements with ECAs that support regional integration investments in order to optimize 
the allocation of trade finance resources to extend impact. 
Effective:  Supporting the private sector provision of trade finance in areas where AfDB 
is  providing  support  to  regional  integration  initiatives  will  not  require  significant 
additional resources.  Analogous to working capital financing for firms making large 
capital investments, AfDB’s support will encourage private sector financiers.   25 
Efficient:  By  supporting  trade  finance  facilitation  and  trade  administration  reforms, 
AfDB will leverage the large investments made in physical infrastructure in order to 
maximize the impact on broad-based economic growth.   As has been noted above, intra-
African  trade  has  higher  returns  to  job  creation  and  economic  growth  than  primary 
product exports to developed countries and emerging Asia.  Accordingly, these small 
marginal  investments  to  ensure  that  intra-African  trade  accelerates  will  have  a  large 
impact. 
Prudent:  As has been noted above, African trade is highly dependent on trade finance.  
The risks associated with AfDB’s large infrastructural investments will decline as trade 
finance is available to support economic activity. 
Recognizable:  AfDB is recognized as the leading infrastucture bank in Africa.  Support 
to increase the impact of these investments in physical infrastructure will further increase 
AfDB’s visibility as a partner to regional member countries. 
Support for Trade with Asia 
 
Summary:  Asia-Africa trade is growing rapidly and China is becoming an important 
trading partner across the continent, even for resource constrained countries.  Chinese 
trade with Africa remains limited by financing as Chinese banks are unfamiliar with 
African  risks.    AfDB  should  work  with  Chinese  and  African  financial  institutions  to 
promote risk-sharing and better information exchange.   
As noted above, African trade with Asia, particularly China, is growing rapidly.  Sub-
Saharan  exports  to  China  have  grown  14%  per  annum  since  1999  while  sub-Sahara 
Africa’s imports from China have grown by over 25% per year during the same period.  
China represents a significant market for many African exporters.  Zambia, for example, 
realized  49%  per  year  growth  in  exports  to  China  from  2004  to  2009  and  China 
represents almost 30% of all Zambian exports.  Similarly, Ethiopian exports to China 
have grown by 70% per year over the same period and the Chinese market comprises 
15% of all Ethiopian exports.  Even in markets that are raw material scarce, China is fast 
becoming an important partner.  Senegalese exports to China have grown 60% per year 
over the past 5 years but only represent 2% of Senegalese exports.  Senegalese bankers 
expect China to become a more important partner for Senegalese exporters. 
Similarly, China’s importance as an exporter to Africa is growing.  Chad, for example, 
has seen its imports from China grow 90% per year since 2004 and Chinese imports now 
comprise over 10% of all Chadian imports.  Similarly, Niger and Rwanda have realized 
annual Chinese import growth of over 60% per year. 
Exports from China are growing all over Africa but 7 countries comprise over 70% of 
Chinese exports to Africa.  Surprisingly, four of the seven are resource-constrained low 
income countries:  Benin, Liberia, Kenya and Ghana all import more than $1.2 billion in 
Chinese exports. 
Bankers  contacted  throughout  this  survey  have  indicated  that  trade  with  China  is 
constrained by Asian banks’ unfamiliarity with the continent and its financial institutions.  
“They  know  Citibank  and  Commerzbank”  is  how  one  Rwandan  financial  institution 
described Chinese banks.  Even in the larger markets where China has more experience,   26 
the  lack  of  local  knowledge  constrains  trade  finance  availability.    A  Nigerian  bank 
described  their  experience  commenting  that  “Chinese  ECAs  provide  weak  support 
because  they  do  not  know  enough  about  local  banks.”    One  international  bank  with 
subsidiaries in Africa reported that “trade with China represents 40% of our business in 
Ghana” and is growing rapidly but remains constrained by “lack of information about 
opportunities.” 
In addition the African Development Bank should explore opportunities to sign a Master 
Risk Participation Agreement with the Asian Development Bank as it develops its trade 
finance activities.  A Master Risk Participation Agreement would allow each institution 
to provide risk cover for trade transactions undertaken by the other.  This would allow 
more efficient allocation of available trade finance risk appetite across Africa-Asia trade 
transactions.   
 
VI.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Trade  Finance in  Africa is  characterized by continuing volatility, which is  driven by 
regulatory change, an unstable competitive landscape, new trade patterns and a weak 
demand. All these elements exaggerate the perceived riskiness of African trade finance 
markets, and subsequently growth of trade is constrained by lack of financing due to 
higher risk perceptions. 
The following recommendations are therefore presented for discussion during the round 
table. They assume the establishment of a trade finance team along with a dedicated 
interface within the trade finance ecosystem of the Bank. 
  Supporting trade financiers through guarantee facilities: LIC-based commercial 
banks cannot access adequate financing due to high perceived risks.  Individual 
guarantees to confirming banks will require a large team to analyze credits and 
monitor  usage/performance.    Partial  portfolio-based  guarantees  issued  to  well-
managed commercial banks will stimulate private sector finance to LICs.   
  Support regional integration by providing finance for intra-regional trade: AfDB 
support for trade finance provision via regional integration initiatives could be in 
the form of targeted lines or risk participation through financiers of infrastructure 
projects.  AfDB support to trade finance alongside infrastructure investments will 
act as a catalyzer for other private sector agents.   
  Support trade diversification, especially with Asia via greater cooperation and 
information sharing with the Asian Development Bank and other trade financiers 
in the region: Asia-Africa trade is growing rapidly and China is becoming an 
important  trading  partner  across  the  continent,  even  for  resource  constrained 
countries.  Chinese trade with Africa remains below potential as Chinese banks 
are unfamiliar with African risks.  AfDB should work with Chinese and African 
financial institutions to promote risk-sharing and better information exchange.   
  Improving the information gap regarding trading firms in Africa: Basel II will 
increase cost of trade finance in Africa due to lack of consistent, portable and   27 
validatable data on trade asset performance over time. The African Development 
Bank  should  collaborate  with  AsDB  and  ICC  and  develop  an  African  Trade 
Finance Default Register. 
 
Financial Institutions Contacted 
 
  Access Bank 
  Afrexim Bank 
  Africa Trade Insurance Agency 
  Amal Bank 
  Arab African International Bank       
  Asian Development Bank 
  Bank of Africa (Kenya, Senegal, Burkina Faso)     
  Banque Atlantique (Senegal, Burkina Faso)       
  Banque Commerciale de Burkina     
  Banque du Caire         
  Banque Internationale du Burkina 
  Banque Misr           
  Banque Regionale des Marches   
  Banque Rwandaise de Developpement 
  Barclays Bank (Dubai, Kenya, Ghana)         
  BICIS 
  Blom Bank           
  BMCE Bank 
  BSIC 
  CAL Bank 
  CBAO 
  CGIC 
  Citibank (Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, UK) 
  Commercial Bank of Africa         
  Commercial International Bank       
  Coris Bank 
  Diamond Trust Bank        
  Ecobank (Kenya, Senegal, Burkina, Nigeria, Ghana)     
  Egyptian Gulf Bank         
  FCMB Bank 
  Fina Bank           
  First Bank London 
  First National Bank 
  First Rand Bank 
  FMO 
  GT Bank (Nigeria, Ghana)         
  HSBC Bank 
  I&M Bank           
  IFC 
  Inter-American Development Bank 
  Investec           
  JP Morgan (UK) 
  Kenya Commercial Bank         
  National Bank of Egypt         
  Natixis  
  Nedbank  
  NIC Bank           
  Oceanic Bank 
  OFID 
  PHB Bank   28 
  Prudential Bank   
  PTA Bank 
  Rand Merchant Bank         
  Reichmans  
  SACE 
  Sasfin  
  Scipion Capital 
  SGBS 
  SMBC (UK) 
  Spring Bank 
  Standard Bank (Kenya, South Africa, Ghana)     
  Standard Chartered Bank (Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, UK)     
  Suez Canal Bank         
  Trust Bank 
  UBA (Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso)       
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